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Abstract
In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice
f r o mt h o s et h a th a v ep l a y e di tb e f o r et h e m . S u c ha d v i c ec a nf a c i l i t a t e
the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact
of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping gen-
erational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by
another subject to whom he can oﬀer advice.
Our results document the fact that allowing advice has a dramatic
impact on the behavior of subjects. It diminishes the variance of oﬀers
made over time, lowers their mean, and causes Receivers to reject low
oﬀers with higher probability. In addition, by reading the advice oﬀered
we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the oﬀers
of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many of the decisions we make we rely on the advice of others who have
preceded us. For example, before we buy a car, choose a dentist, choose a
spouse, ﬁnd a school for our children, etc. we usually ask the advice of others
who have experience with such decisions. The same is true when we play games.
In international aﬀairs before a current president or prime minister makes a
decision in an important international situation he or she asks the advice of
those who went before. In industry, when a C.E.O. retires he or she passes
on the wisdom of his or her years to his or her successor. In this manner the
conventions of behavior that have been established in the past are preserved
and passed on from generation to generation.
For this reason it might be important when examining behavior in a game like
the Ultimatum Game to play that game in the lab in a manner that mimics how
such a game might be played in the real world. More precisely, the Ultimatum
Game can be interpreted as a contracting game in which an oﬀer must be made
by one person and either accepted or rejected by the other. (A share-cropping
game between landlord and farmer may be an example). If this game is played
repeatedly over time by a sequence of generations, then we might likely expect
previous generations to pass on advice to their successors as to how to play and
also pass on to them whatever conventions of behavior pertain to the game such
as what oﬀers they expect will be accepted and what type will be rejected.
Such an explanation for conventionally-determined behavior is oﬀered in an
article by Alvin Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuna-Fujiwara and Shumuel
2Zamir (1991) who compare the behavior of subjects engaged in an Ultimatum
Game across four countries: the United States, Japan, Israel, and Yugoslavia.
At the end of their paper they conclude that the diﬀerence in the behavior they
observe is not the result of diﬀerences in the type of people inhabiting these
countries (i.e. Israelis are not more aggressive than Americans by nature) as
much as a cultural diﬀerence that has emerged in these countries which leads
them to a diﬀerent set of mutual expectations about what oﬀers are acceptable;
i.e., a diﬀerent convention.
“This suggests that what varied between subject pools is not a prop-
erty like aggressiveness or toughness, but rather the perception of
what constitutes a reasonable oﬀer under the circumstances”(Roth
et al., (1991, p. 1092).
Burke and Young (2001a and 2001b) use a similar type of argument to
explain the emergence of share-cropping conventions.
In this paper we use the apparatus of what Schotter and Sopher (2000)
call intergenerational games to investigate the impact of advice giving in inter-
generational Ultimatum Games. In these games a sequence of non-overlapping
“generations” of players play a stage game for a ﬁnite number of periods and
are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for a
similar length of time. Players in generation t are allowed to communicate with
their successors in generation t+1 and advise them on how they should behave.
In addition, they care about the succeeding generation in the sense that each
generation’s payoﬀ is a function not only of the payoﬀs achieved during their
generation but also of the payoﬀsa c h i e v e db ye a c ho ft h e i rc h i l d r e ni nt h eg a m e
3that is played after they retire. These types of games have proven to be very
useful in describing the evolution of conventions of behavior in coordination
games (see Schotter and Sopher (2000)).
What we expected when we started this experiment was that over time, in
our intergenerational Ultimatum Game, one oﬀer would emerge as the “con-
ventional” laboratory oﬀer meaning that Senders would repeatedly make this
oﬀer to Receivers, advise their successors to do so also, and hold beliefs that
supported this oﬀer as payoﬀ maximizing. For this reason in our experiment
we not only solicited advice but elicited (using a proper scoring rule) the beliefs
of the Senders and Receivers concerning the behavior of their opponents in an
eﬀort to see if we could detect not only an equilibrium in actions but also an
equilibrium in beliefs.
What we ﬁnd contradicts our initial expectations in that the time series
of oﬀers made in our experiment fails to converge to one conventional oﬀer.
Rather, throughout the length of the history of our game the variance of oﬀers
is positive and non-neglible. What we do ﬁnd, however, is that there is a clear
and dramatic impact of advice on behavior in our experiment. More precisely,
we ﬁnd that while the strong form of our expectations were not borne out, a
weaker form was substantiated in that the variance of oﬀers made is signiﬁcantly
less in those treatments where advice is available. In this sense, behavior is
more “conventional” when advice exists. Another way to put this is to say that
behavior is more erratic in intergenerational games played with only history to
guide behavior than when people either only get advice or are allowed to receive
4both advice and see the history of play before them. History alone is a poor
guide to behavior.
Another ﬁnding is that advice serves as the key variable explaining the oﬀers
sent by Senders. Further, not only is advice important but the type of advice
given is also meaningful. For example, from examining the written advice of-
fered from one generation of Sender to the next, we conclude that arguments
of fairness or backward induction are infrequently relied on by subjects in ra-
tionalizing the oﬀers they suggest to their successors. What is relied on are
arguments of expected payoﬀ maximization. In fact, even when 50-50 splits,
the hallmark of equity oﬀers, are proposed, they are mostly proposed because
the Sender perceives the probability of having lesser oﬀers accepted to be unac-
ceptably low. The advice of Receivers is diﬀerent, however, more often relying
on fairness and spite arguments to justify behavior.
Finally, one of our most interesting observations deals with Receiver rejection
behavior. What we ﬁnd here is that the key element determining rejection
behavior is the diﬀerence between the oﬀer made and the expected oﬀer of the
Receivers. In other words, when an oﬀer made is less than that expected by
the Receiver (as deﬁned by the Receiver’s elicited beliefs), then it is almost
always rejected even if that oﬀer is above the stated minimally acceptable oﬀer
of the Receiver. Stated minimally-acceptable oﬀers provide a poor guide to
rejection behavior in that almost all oﬀers above the minimally-acceptable ones
are rejected if they are also below the oﬀer the Receiver expects to receive. The
distinction here is between the “hot” reaction that subjects seem to have when
5oﬀers arrive that are below their expectations and the “cool” response they give
when hypothetically asked to state a minium.
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we will describe our experiment and
experimental design. Section 3 reports our results, and Section 4 presents some
conclusions.
2 The Experiment: Design and Procedures
2.1 General Features
In the intergenerational Ultimatum Games reported on here subjects, once re-
cruited, were ordered into generations in which each generation plays an Ultima-
tum Game once and only once against an opponent. After their participation
in the game, subjects in any generation t are replaced by a next generation,
t+1, who will be able to view some or all of the history of what has transpired
before them. Subjects in generation t are then required to give advice to their
successors in the form of a strategy (a suggested amount to oﬀer if they are a
Sender) or a minimally acceptable oﬀer (if they are a Receiver). They can also,
if they wish, explain the reasons for their suggested strategy in the form of a
free-form message. The payoﬀs to any subject are equal to the payoﬀse a r n e d
by that generation during their lifetime plus a discounted payoﬀ which depends
on the payoﬀs achieved by their immediate successors. Finally, during their
participation in the game, subjects are asked to predict the actions taken by
their opponent (using a mechanism which makes telling the truth a dominant
6strategy).
The exact sequence of events is as follows. When a subject arrives at his
or her terminal he or she receives written on-screen instructions. After reading
the instructions and having any questions answered, they are shown the advice
oﬀered by their predecessor. This advice has two parts. A strategy which is a
suggested amount to oﬀer by the Sender and a suggested minimally acceptable
oﬀer by the Receiver and a free-form statement oﬀering a justiﬁcation for the
proposed strategy. No subjects could see the advice given to their opponent,
but it was known that each side was given advice. It was also known that each
generational subject could scroll through some subset of the previous history
of the generations (perhaps all depending on the treatment) before it and see
what each generational Sender oﬀered and its acceptance or rejection. They
could not see, however, any of the previous advice given to their predecessors.
After the advice was read, we elicited the beliefs of the Sender or Receiver
using a proper scoring rule to be described in the Appendix. After the beliefs
were elicited subjects played the Ultimatum Game and payoﬀs were determined.
Their ﬁnal payoﬀ could only be determined after the next generation had ﬁn-
ished, however, since their payoﬀ depended on their actions.
Because running such intergenerational experiment can be very time con-
suming, given that we must do them sequentially, we decided on a slightly
diﬀerent design which allowed us to run three diﬀerent intergenerational games
in one session and hence generate observations of three diﬀerent games.
More precisely, each experimental session started with the recruitment of 12
7subjects who were randomly assigned to a group of six. During their experi-
mental session each subject would play three diﬀerent one-shot games with a
diﬀerent opponent. The three games were the Battle of the Sexes Game, the
Ultimatum Game and the Game of Trust of Berg, Dickaut, and McCabe (1995).
To play these games they were randomly matched with a diﬀerent opponent in
each period of the experiment. Hence, a subject might start the experimental
session playing a one-shot Ultimatum Game with one of the other ﬁve subjects,
then after that was over play a one-shot Battle of the Sexes Game with another
subject, and ﬁnally the Trust Game with a third. In each game the subjects
would read the instructions, see advice (or not, depending on the treatment)
state their beliefs, and take an action. For example, an experimental session
might consist of the following sequence of games played by our six subjects:
[Table 1 here]
In this table we see six players performing our experiment in three periods.
In period 1, Players 1 and 6 play the Battle of the Sexes Game once while
Players 2 and 5 play the one-shot Ultimatum Game and Players 3 and 4 play
the one-shot Trust game. When they have ﬁnished their respective games, we
rotate them in the next period so that in period 2 Players 2 and 4 play the
Battle of the Sexes Game while Players 3 and 6 play the Ultimatum Game and
Players 1 and 5 play the Trust game. The same type of rotation is carried out in
period 3 so that at the end of the experiment each subject has played each game
once against a diﬀerent opponent who has not played with any subject he has
played with before. Each generation played the game once and only once and
8their payoﬀ was equal to the payoﬀ they received during their generation plus
an amount equal to 1/2 of the payoﬀ of their successor in the generation t+1
that followed them. (Payoﬀs were denominated in terms of experimental francs
which were converted into U.S. dollars rates which varied according to the game
played.) The design was common knowledge among the subjects except for the
fact that the subjects did not know the precise rotation formula used. They did
know they would face a diﬀerent opponent in each period, however.
As a result of this design, when we were ﬁnished running one group of six
subjects through the lab we generated three generations of data on each of our
three games since, through rotation, each player played each game once and was
therefore a member of some generation in each game. Thus for the set-up cost of
one experiment we generated three generations worth of data on three diﬀerent
intergenerational games at once. Still, our experimental design is extremely
time and labor intensive requiring 152 hours in the lab to generate the data we
report on here. 1
The experiment was run either at the Experimental Laboratory of the C.V.
Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University or at the Exper-
imental Lab in the Department of Economics at Rutgers University. Subjects
were recruited, typically in groups of 12, from undergraduate economics courses
and divided into two groups of six with which they stayed for the entire ex-
periment. During their time in the lab, they earned approximately an average
of $26.10 for about 11
2 hours. All instructions were presented on the computer
1As far as we know, this is the record for economic experiments.
9screens and questions were answered as they arose. (There were relatively few
questions so it appeared that the subjects had no problems understanding the
games being played which purposefully were quite simple). All subjects were
inexperienced in this experiment.
In this paper we will report the results of only the Ultimatum Game played.
In our Ultimatum Game, subjects were randomly assigned to role of Sender or
Receiver. The Sender was initially allocated 100 units of a ﬁctitious laboratory
currency called francs, which were later converted into dollars at the rate of 1
franc equals $.10. The task of the Sender was to divide this 100 francs into
two amounts, x and 100-x. The amount x was proposed to the Receiver as
his portion which the Receiver could either accept or reject. If the Receiver
accepted the proposal, the payoﬀs would be x for the Receiver and 100-x for
the Sender. If the Receiver rejected the proposal, each subject’s payoﬀ would
be zero.
2.1.1 Belief Elicitation
Our belief elicitation procedure (explained in more detail in the Appendix)
worked as follows:
For the Receiver, we asked what they thought the probability was of re-
ceiving any amounts in the intervals 0-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60,
61-70, 71-80, 81-90, 91-100. In other words, we asked them to enter a vector
r=( r 1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10),w i t h
P10
k=1 rk = 100, indicating the probabil-
10ities deﬁned above.2. 3 Receivers were rewarded for their predictions using a
quadratic scoring rule as described in the Appendix of this paper.
To elicit truthful beliefs from the Sender we do an equivalent procedure. The
Sender is going to oﬀer an amount to the Receiver who is going to either accept
or reject. Hence, we ask the Sender to assign probabilities to the acceptance
or rejection of any oﬀer in our ten intervals. More precisely, let us index the
intervals by k = 1,2,..., 10. Then the Sender would type ten probability vectors
into the computer of the following form: rk =( πk
a,πk
r). Here πk
a is the probability
that if an amount in the kth interval is sent it will be accepted while πk
r is the
complementary probability that the oﬀer will be rejected. From this point on the
payoﬀs are identical to the ones deﬁned above but they are deﬁned conditional on
the amount sent. Note that since the Sender knows how much he or she will send
before he makes his prediction, his reported probabilities are meaningful only for
that interval since all the others have zero probability of being relevant. Hence,
nothing guarantees that these reports are truthful for amounts in intervals not
sent yet, the scoring function should be incentive compatible for the beliefs in
the interval of actual amount sent. With this proviso, we will still refer to
these ”out of equilibrium beliefs” at various points and use them as truthful
reports.4 As you will see, however, none of our more important claims rely on
this information.
We made sure that the amount of money that could potentially be earned
2In the instructions rj is expressed as numbers in [0,100], so we must divide by 100 to get
probabilities.
3See Appendix 1 for the instructions concerning this part of the experiment.
4Obviously, there is no positive incentive to misrepresents beliefs in these intervals.
11in the prediction part of the experiment was not large in comparison to the
game being played. (In fact, the maximum earnings that could be earned in
the prediction part of the Ultimatum Game was only $2.00 as opposed to the
maximum payoﬀ in the game itself of $10.00). The fear here was that if more
money could be earned by predicting well rather than playing well, then a Sender
might want to oﬀer the full 100 points to the Receiver knowing that it will be
accepted for sure and predict that outcome. This actually happened only once.
It is interesting to note that our experiment provides a whole host of data
and information that is missing in most if not all other studies of the Ultimatum
Game. For example, since we elicit beliefs we are able to track the beliefs of
generational agents over time. This is important since a convention of behavior
depends very much on the underlying beliefs that people have about each other
(what Schotter (1981) calls the“norms of society”). In addition, we are able
to observe what the subjects report as their true willingness to accept. By
observing and coding the advice that is oﬀered, we are able get another insight
into the thinking of our subjects that is not typically available. Hence, our data
set involves actions, beliefs, and advice all of which we keep track of as our
laboratory society evolves.
2.2 Parameter Speciﬁcation
The experiments can be characterized by four parameters. The ﬁrst is the length
of the history that each generation t player is allowed to see. The second is inter-
generational discount rate indicating the fraction of the next generation’s payoﬀ
12to be added to any give generational players payoﬀ. The third is the number of
periods each generation lives for (i.e. the number of times they repeat the game)
while the fourth indicates whether advice is allowable between generations. In
all of our experiments each generation lives for one period or repeats the trust
game only once and has a discount rate of 1/2. Hence, they only diﬀer on the
basis of the length of history the subjects are allowed to view before playing and
whether the are able to get advice from their predecessor or not. In the Baseline
Ultimatutm Game experiment subjects could pass advice to their successor and
see the full history of all generations before them. This Baseline experiment
was run for 81 generations. After we had run the Baseline experiment for 52
periods we started two separate and independent new treatments one which we
call the Advice-only treatment (sometimes referred to as AO) and the History-
only treatment (sometimes referred to as HO). In Advice-only Treatment before
any generation made its move it could see only the last generation’s history and
nothing else. This treatment isolated the eﬀect of advice on the play of the
intergenerational game. The History-only Treatment was identical to the Base-
line except for the fact that no generation was able to pass advice onto their
successors. They could see the entire history, however, so that this treatment
isolated the impact of history. Advice-only Treatment was run for an additional
80 generations while the History-only Treatment was run for an additional 66
generations, each starting after generation 52 was completed in the Baseline.
Hence, our Baseline was of length 81, the Advice-only Treatment was of length
13785 and the History-only Treatment was of length 66. Our experimental design
can be represented by Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
3R e s u l t s :
In presenting our results we will proceed by presenting a set of observations
which we hope to substantiate using the data generated.
3.1 Observations
In this section we will present a set of observations about our data and test
a set of implied hypotheses which statistically substantiate these observations.
We organize our presentation of the results by proceeding systemically and
presenting a set of observations about the oﬀers of Sender subjects, the advice
they were given, their beliefs, and the advice they oﬀer their successors. We
then proceed to look at the analogous behavior of Receivers.
3.2 Sender Behavior
3.2.1 Oﬀers:
Observation 1: Advice Lowers the Variance of Oﬀers.
Let MB, MAO, and MHO be the mean oﬀer in the Baseline, Advice-
only Treatment and the History-only Treatment and let VB, VAO, and
5One generation was lost because of a computer crash. The lost generation was the third
(last) period of a session. We were able to reconstrcut the relevant data ﬁles
14VHO be their associated variances. Then VAO < VB <VHO. In addi-
tion, in the Advice-only treatment, oﬀers decrease as time progresses
but this is not true in the Baseline or the History-only Treatment.
Finally, if we look at the mean oﬀers made during the last 40 gener-
ations, MAO < MHO < MB.
Substantiation
What Observation 1 says is that the variance of oﬀers is least in Advice-
only Treatment, where only advice is present, and greatest in the History-only
Treatment where there is no advice. This leads to the conclusion that advice is a
key ingredient into making economic behavior in our experiments more orderly.
To explore oﬀer behavior more systematically, consider Table 2 which present
some descriptive statistics about the oﬀer behavior of our subjects and Figures
2a-2c which presents a set of histograms of the oﬀers in each experiment.
[Table 2 here]
[Figure 2 here]
There are some things to note. First note that by comparing the oﬀers
made in Advice-only treatment to those of the History-only treatment we see
that one impact of advice is to truncate the right tail of the oﬀer distribution.
In fact while only 10% of the oﬀers in the Baseline and Advice-only treatment
were above 58 and 50 respectively, in the History-only treatment 10% of the
observations were above 80. Note also that the distribution is much ﬂatter in
the History-only treatment and that there is much less of a spike at the modal
choice than in either of the other treatments. In fact, the standard deviation of
15oﬀers is almost twice as great in the History-only treatment than in the Advice-
only treatment where subjects have access exclusively to advice (except for a
one period history). A series of one-tailed F-tests supports this observation for
binary comparisons between with the History-only treatment and the Baseline
(F(65,80) = 2.16, p = .00) and the History-only treatment and the Advice-only
treatment (F(65,76) = 2.90, p = .00). The same test found a diﬀerence between
the variances of the Advice-only treatment and the Baseline at only the 10%
level. What this indicates is that history does not seem to supply a suﬃcient
lesson for subjects to guide their behavior in a smooth and consistent manner.
Advice seems to be needed. Finally note that the mode does shift lower when
we move from the Baseline to the Advice-only treatment.
With respect to time, it appears that only in the Advice-only treatment do
oﬀers change over time in a statistically signiﬁcant (and negative) manner. To
illustrate this point we ran a simple OLS regression of oﬀers made on time. In
all regressions, except the one run on the Advice-only treatment data, time was
insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. In the the Advice-only treatment regression, the
16coeﬃcient was negative and signiﬁcant at the .003% level. 6
Looking at the mean oﬀers in the last 40 generations we see that there is a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the mean oﬀers made between the Advice-
only and the History-only treatments using a Wilcoxon test at the 2% level (z
= -2.295, p = .02.). No such diﬀerence exists in the comparison between the
Baseline and the History-only treatment.
It appears then that the inclusion of advice leads subjects to conclude that
sending lower oﬀers is a beneﬁcial thing to do. Interestingly, this lesson seems
to be a function of advice and disappears when subjects are allowed to view
history even when advice is also allowed, as in the Baseline.
Our discussion of oﬀers in Observation 1 suggests that we should investigate
what factors are important in generating these oﬀers. To pursue this question,
we oﬀer the following observation.
Observation 2: Advice Determines Oﬀers
Advice is the key determinant in deciding upon oﬀers. In fact,
subjects tend to follow the advice of their generational predecessor
6
Regressions of Oﬀer on Time:
Baseline
Coef. Std. Err t P>|t
time .0267615 .0714438 0.375 0.709
cons 43.60648 3.372018 12.932 0.000
F1,79 = .14,p=0 .71
Treatment I
Coef. Std. Err t P>|t
time -.1954361 .0626288 -3.121 0.003
cons 44.79084 2.81133 15.932 0.000
F1,75 =9 .74,p=0 .00
Treatment II
Coef. Std. Err t P>|t
time .0710156 .1427262 0.498 0.620
cons 40.07552 5.500362 7.286 0.000
F1,64 = .25,p=0 .62
17even when their own beliefs suggest that they would maximize their
expected payoﬀ by oﬀering something else.
Substantiation
Before we present any statistical analysis to back up this observation, con-
sider Figures 3a-3b which plot the times series of oﬀe r si ne a c ho fo u rt r e a t m e n t s
involving advice against the advice the Sender received (in the Baseline and the
Advice-only treatment ) and also against their subjective payoﬀ maximizing
oﬀer. By subjective payoﬀ maximizing oﬀer we mean that oﬀer which, given
the elicited beliefs of the subjects, would maximize their expected payoﬀ if sent.
Remember, for each potential oﬀer in intervals 0-10, 11-20,....., 91-100, we have
elicited the beliefs of the Sender subject as to the likelihood that such an oﬀer
would be accepted. Hence, we can take an expected value by assuming an of-
fer at the midpoint of these intervals was sent and multiplying these oﬀers by
their elicited probabilities. This yields ten distinct values, each representing the
expected payoﬀ from sending an oﬀer in each interval where the expectation
is taken over the subjects subjective elicited beliefs. We take the maximum of
these ten values whose argmax can take one of the values 5, 15, 25, ..., or 95.
[Figure 3 here]
Note from Figures 3a and 3b the close ﬁt between the advice that Senders
receive from their predecessors and the oﬀers they make. This is true for both
the Baseline experiment and the Advice-only treatment. Note also, however,
that despite the fact that our payoﬀ-maximizing oﬀe rc a no n l yt a k eo nt e n
discrete values, they seem to ﬁtt h ep a t t e r no fo ﬀers made reasonably well,
18though there are many exceptions.
To discriminate between these two variables, we ran a simple linear regression
in which our dependent variable was the amount sent and the independent vari-
ables were the advice subjects were given and their subjective payoﬀ-maximizing
oﬀer. We ran this for both the Baseline and the Advice-only treatments. (Ob-
viously the History-only treatment did not have advice). These results are
presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 here]
These results once again indicate how important advice is for behavior in
our experiments. Most striking is that fact that it seems to weigh more heavily
in the minds of Senders than do their own beliefs in the sense that when the
advice they get contradicts their best response predictions, they seem to opt for
following advice rather than best responding to their beliefs.
T h eq u e s t i o nt h a ti sr a i s e db yt h e s er e s u l t si sh o ww o u l ds u b j e c t sb e h a v e
when no advice is given as was true in the History-only treatment. Would, under
these circumstances, subjects concentrate on their best response oﬀer? Table 4
oﬀers the answer to this question since it reports the results of a regression run
on the History-only treatment data in which we regress the oﬀer made simply
on the subjects subjective payoﬀ-maximizing oﬀer.
[Table 4 here]
As Table 4 indicates, subjects do not appear to focus on their best response
oﬀers even in that experiment where they are not distracted by advice.
19If advice is so important, however, then it would be interesting to see how
this advice varies across experiments which oﬀer subjects diﬀerent access to
history of the generations before them.
Observation 3: History Raises Advised Oﬀers.
The advice given by subjects to their successors is greater in the
B a s e l i n et h a ni nt h eA d vice-only treatment.
Substantiation:
We substantiate this observation by presenting Table 5 which simply presents
the mean, median and variance of advice oﬀered by subjects in these two ex-
periments along with the results of a simple Wilcoxon test run to test the null
hypothesis that these two samples were drawn from the same population.
[Table 5 here]
As we see, advice is lower in the Advice-only treatment and signiﬁcantly so.
Observation 4: Pessimistic Beliefs.
Beliefs of Senders tend to be overly pessimistic, compared to what
the history of the game implies their beliefs should be.
Substantiation
When we call beliefs overly pessimistic we mean the following. For each
sub-interval 0-10, 11-20, 21-30, etc. we have elicited the belief of each of our
generational Senders as to what they think the chances are that an oﬀer in this
interval would be accepted. Hence, each Sender reports a vector of 10 such be-
liefs. Call these the subject’s Stated Beliefs. At each generation we can also look
at the history of play of the game and actually count the fraction of times oﬀers
20in these intervals were accepted (assuming we have some observations in that
interval). Call these fractions the subject’s Historical Beliefs. By pessimistic we
mean that the Stated beliefs of subjects are consistently below their Historical
Beliefs.
To substantiate this observation we present Table 6 which provides a set of
descriptive statistics to support our claim.
[Table 6 here]
What you see in this table is, for each treatment, the 10 intervals over
which beliefs were elicited along with the average Stated and Historical beliefs
of Senders for amounts in that interval. For example, take the interval 41-50 in
the Baseline. In the row entitled Stated we have the average over all generations
of the subjects’ Stated Beliefs for that interval. As you see, on average, subjects
felt that an oﬀer in the 41-50 interval would be accepted with probability .55. In
fact, if one looks historically at what actually happened when such oﬀers were
made (see the row entitled Historical) we ﬁnd that on average, such oﬀers were
accepted with a probability of .94.(There were 42 such generations in which
oﬀers in the 41-50 interval were made).7 Hence, subjects seemed, on average, to
greatly under estimate the willingness of their opponents to accept oﬀers in this
interval. The same pattern exists for all intervals and all treatments except in
7An o t eo fc l a r i ﬁcation here. This Historical beliefs probability is calculated by taking
an average of the moving averages deﬁning these historical belief. For example, assume that
our experiment had only ﬁve periods and say that over those ﬁve periods there were four
instances where oﬀers in the interval 41-50 were sent (generations 1, 2, 3,and 5) and the
Receivers decisions were Accept, Accept, Reject, and Accept. Then the historical beliefs at
these generations would be 1, 1, 2/3, 3/4 and the average of these would be .85 which is what
we would report in this table.
21the intervals 81-90 and 91-100 for the History-only treatment where the opposite
is true. Note the small number of observations here, however.8
There are some further aspects of Table 6 worth noting. First, note that
all mean Stated beliefs are monotonically increasing across intervals so that, on
average, subjects did feel that higher oﬀers had a higher probability of being
accepted.9 This was not true for Historical beliefs, however. Also note that
when we compare Stated beliefs across treatments, beliefs are always, (except
for the comparison of beliefs in interval 91-100 between the Baseline and the
Advice-only treatment) highest in the Advice-only treatment where no history
is allowed. This leads to the impression that history tends to make people more
pessimistic despite the fact that, objectively, it should have made them more
optimistic.
If beliefs are too pessimistic then oﬀers would tend to be too high in the
sense that Senders could in actuality lower their oﬀers and increase their ex-
pected payoﬀs. This raises the question as to whether a signiﬁcant portion of
the Ultimatum Game puzzle, that subject do not send their sub-game perfect
equilibrium oﬀer and tend to make oﬀers in the middle of the allowable range
(around 50), is merely the result of misperceived probabilities. We are able to
8If we had room to present the full time series of these two belief series, the reader would
see that this pattern is persistent over all generations and intervals and does not diminish
toward the end of the experiment when there are relatively more observations, at least in
some intervals.
9In fact, 87% of subjects stated beliefs that were monotonically increasing in the oﬀer
amount. 6% stated beliefs that were ”single-peaked,” ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
Another 7% stated beliefs with at least 3 montone segments. Restricting Table 6 to those
with montone stated beliefs would increase the average, especially in the 5 highest ranges of
oﬀers, but would not change any of the conclusions we draw below about the pessimism of
stated beliefs.
22s u g g e s tt h a tt h i sm a yb et r u eb e c a u s ew eh a v ee l i c i t e dt h eb e l i e f so fo u rs u b -
jects and are in a position to know what oﬀer was subjective payoﬀ maximizing
given Sender beliefs whereas such information was not available to previous
investigators.
It should be pointed out, however, that for many oﬀer ranges the number of
observations is too small to be useful for comparison. For those situations where
too little evidence exists, subjects are free to conjecture as they wish and one
could make a case that some of the behavior we observe in this experiment might
be consistent with the type of self-conﬁrming equilibrium of the Fudenberg-
Levine (1993) type where segments of the strategy space are left unexplored so
that players are free to hold expectations about what would happen there that
are unconstrained by experience.
3.2.2 Receivers:
These ﬁrst four observations explain the behavior of the Senders. The Re-
ceivers, however, also exhibited diﬀerences in their behavior depending upon
which treatment they engaged in. The following two observations discuss some
of these diﬀerences.
Observation 5: Advice Makes Receivers Tougher
Deﬁning a low oﬀer as one below 25 and a ”tough” Receiver as one
who rejects low oﬀers, the probability of having a low oﬀer accepted
is lowest in the Advice-only treatment, second lowest in the Baseline
and highest in the History-only treatment. In other words, the bigger
23the role allowed for advice (as in the Advice-only treatment where
there is no history) the tougher are the Receivers.
Substantiation:
There are more conceptual diﬃculties involved in analyzing Receiver behav-
ior than Sender behavior. For example, in analyzing the acceptance or rejection
behavior of Receivers across treatments, we would ideally like to condition on
the oﬀer made and see if, when identical oﬀers are made, they are rejected or
accepted with identical frequency across treatments. Unfortunately, the set of
oﬀers actually made may vary across experimental treatments and hence such
a controlled comparison can not always be made.
We can, however, estimate a conditional acceptance function by simply
running a logit regression of the dichotomous acceptance variable against the
amount oﬀered in each of our three treatments and comparing the resulting




w h e r exi st h ea m o u n to ﬀered and the left hand variable is a {0,1} variable
taking a value of 1 if x is accepted and 0 otherwise. This would present us
with an estimate of the conditional rejection behavior of subjects in our three
treatments and we can use this as a basis of comparison.
The results of these estimations are presented in Figure 4 which plots the
resulting estimated acceptance functions and superimposes them on the same
24graph.10
[Figure 4 here]
W h a tw es e ei nF i g u r e4i st h a tf o rl o wo ﬀers, the probability of acceptance
is ordered in the manner described by the observation, i.e., they are least likely
to be accepted when only advice exists (the Advice-only treatment) and most
likely to be accepted when no advice is present but access to history is unlimited
(the History-only treatment). The Baseline, in which both treatments exist
simultaneously, is in between.
While Figure 4 presents a relationship between the likelihood of acceptance
and the amount sent, it does not dig deeply into what motivates acceptance
behavior. To investigate this, we ran a more elaborate logit estimation in which




Variable coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) (z P>| z |
accept
sent .10(.03) 3.62 0.00
constant -2.39 (1.07) -2.24 0.03
obs = 81
Pseudo R2 = .24 LL =-29.62
Advice only
Variable coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) (z P>| z |
accept
sent .16 (.04) 4.10 0.00
constant -4.20 (1.32) -3.18 0.00
obs = 77
Pseudo R2 = .41 LL =2 4 . 7 1
History only
Variable coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) (z P>| z |
accept
sent .022 (.01) 1.52 0.13
constant —.048 (.61) -0.08 0.94
obs = 66
Pseudo R2 = .03 LL =- 3 9 . 1 6
25function of their stated minimum acceptable oﬀer, their expected oﬀer given
their stated beliefs, the advice they received from their predecessors ( in the
Baseline and the Advice-only treatment), the oﬀer they received and appropriate
diﬀerences among these variables. What we ﬁnd is summarized in Observation
6a n ds u b s t a n t i a t e db e l o w :
Observation 6: Unfulﬁlled Expectations Cause Rejection
The key variable inﬂuencing rejection behavior appears to be whether
or not the oﬀer received by the Receiver is above or below that which
he expects to receive and not the relationship between the oﬀer and
the stated minimal acceptable oﬀer of the receiver.
Substantiation:
In our experiment we have elicited a great deal of information about Re-
ceivers which can be of great help in describing rejection behavior. For example,
we know what they stated as their ex ante minimum acceptable oﬀer, and we
can calculate the oﬀer they expect to receive from the Sender using the beliefs
elicited beliefs. In addition, we know what they have been advised to accept
by their predecessor. By comparing the oﬀer received to these variables and
observing rejection and acceptance behavior, we should be able to learn a great
deal about how subjects decide to accept or reject an oﬀer.
Table 7 describes the rejection and acceptance behavior of subjects on the
basis of the diﬀerence between the oﬀer they receive and either their minimal
acceptable, expected, or advised acceptable oﬀer. Note that if any one of these
three variables explains either acceptance or rejection behavior it must be such
26that whenever the oﬀer exceeds any one of them it is accepted while when it is
below it is rejected. For example, if expectations matter for behavior, then we
would expect any oﬀer below a subject’s expectations would be rejected while
any oﬀer above would be accepted. Table 7 presents our results:
[Table 7 here]
A number of things are notable in this table. First, the diﬀerence between
what a Receiver was oﬀered and what they expected to receive is very good
at correctly classifying rejections, but is bad at classifying acceptances. For
example, of the 15 rejections in the Baseline experiment, 14 occurred when
the Receiver was not oﬀered at least his expected amount. However, of the 66
acceptances in the Baseline, 33 occurred in instances where the amount oﬀered
was less than a Receiver’s expectations. Similar patterns exist in the other
treatments as well.
The diﬀerence between a Sender’s oﬀer and a Receiver’s stated minimum
acceptable oﬀer has just the opposite eﬀect; very good at classifying acceptances
but bad at classifying rejections. For example, in the Baseline again, of the 66
acceptances 62 occurred when the oﬀer was greater than the stated minimum
acceptable. (It is not surprising that the result here is stronger than that for
the expected oﬀer since it is almost always the case that a Receiver’s expected
oﬀer is greater than his or her stated minimum acceptable oﬀer). However,
of the 15 rejections in the Baseline, 11 occurred when the oﬀer received was
greater than the stated minimum. This seems to imply that rejection behavior
is a “hot” phenomenon perhaps triggered for some subjects by a deﬂation of
27expectations, while stating a minimal acceptable oﬀer is more a more detached
“cold” phenomenon.(See, Brandts J. and Charness, G., (2000)).
The diﬀerence between the oﬀer and advice received variable is, perhaps, a
good compromise, doing a reasonable, though not outstanding, job of classifying
both acceptances and rejections. Hence one could state that advice is important
for Receivers since it avoids the extremes exhibited by those other variables.
Overall, however, our analysis of Receiver behavior shows a less dramatic role
for advice than was true for Senders.
3.3 Advice
While we have concentrated exclusively on the quantitative aspects of our data,
we do have a plethora of qualitative data in the form of written advice from one
generation to the next. These texts are a treasure trove of insight into what
our subjects were thinking not only during their our experiment but, perhaps,
even of what subjects think Ultimatum Game experiments are about in general.
Such data is obviously unique to our experiment and the results we reach are
summarized by the following observation.
Observation 7: Sender and Receiver Advice Diﬀer
While the advice of Senders appears to be own payoﬀ oriented
and infrequently mentions fairness, Receiver advice reﬂects a more
inter-dependent utility orientation.
Substantiation.
In rationalizing advice in our experiment, a subject might appeal to a number
28of diﬀerent motivations. For example, one might advise a particular split (say
50-50) on equity grounds. On the other hand, one might just as well rationalize
a 50-50 split on payoﬀ maximizing grounds if one thought that, given your
subjective acceptance probabilities, such an oﬀer is a best response. Such a
rationalization need not appeal to equity at all. Alternatively, one may support
oﬀering only 1 by appealing to the notion of backward induction as is expected
of sub-game perfect equilibrium arguments. Backward induction arguments,
however, need not only be used to support sending 1. One might advise one’s
successor that 10 is the best oﬀer to make because one thinks that there is
a threshold below which one’s opponent will reject any oﬀer but above which
the oﬀer would be accepted. The argument here is identical to the sub-game
perfect argument but the threshold is not zero. This is how a non-subgame
perfect Nash convention can be established. Finally, one can refer to history
and look for precedent in what to send or advise one’s successor how to make
predictions in the experiment since a subject’s payoﬀ was also aﬀected by how
well they predicted what their opponent would do.
In analyzing our advice data we proceeded as follows. First we read each
Sender and Receiver comment. After doing this we broke down the Senders com-
ments into 6 sub-groups: Best response Advice (BRA) which basically supports
an oﬀer on the basis of expected payoﬀ maximization, Backward induction ad-
vice (BI), which is the type of advice consistent with subgame perfection in that
it posits that the Receiver will accept any oﬀer and then advises the Sender to
send as little as possible given that expectation, Fairness advice (FA), History-
29based advice (HBA) which refers to precedent or personal experience in the
game, prediction advice (PA), which is advice informing one successor how to
make a good prediction, and ”other” (OA) which is advice that falls into none
of the above categories.
For any text we simply recorded any and all types of advice it contained.
For example, if a piece of advice contained references to fairness, backward
induction, and payoﬀ maximization, we counted all of them in our coding. Our
p o i n tw a sn o tt od e ﬁne each piece of data as belonging to one and only one
category, but rather to count all of the arguments used to bolster the advice
given. Hence, in the Baseline where there were 81 generations there is likely to
be more than 81 advice codings since the same text can be counted in many
diﬀerent categories. For example, consider the following advice written by the
Sender in generation 46 of the Advice-only treatment which includes elements
of many diﬀerent types of advice in extremely pure form:
“The guy before me thought I should send 50. Although, that would
be fair, it’s not going to maximize your payoﬀ.I w a s g r e e d y a n d
oﬀered 10, thinking that the other guy would accept anything he
got, BUT that wasn’t the case. They rejected. So my advice is to
be a little more generous, so about 30 should do it. Good Luck”
This quote was coded as BRA, BI, FA, and HA since it included elements
of all of these.
For the Receiver we proceeded as described above except that we changed
the categories slightly given the diﬀering roles of the subjects. We retained the
codings BI, FA, HA, PA and OA but dropped BRA since this was not appro-
priate to the context. We added a category SP (spite) for all those references
30which suggested retribution if the amount sent was too small and in doing so
indicated that relative payoﬀs were important and also BI+ which is basically
advice that says accept anything above a strictly positive threshold. Spite and
fairness are very close to each other so we have merged them in the table below,
but we point out that spite has a much more mean-spirited objective.
A spite statement might read as did this one representing subject 45 in the
the Advice-only treatment who suggested a minimum acceptable oﬀer of 40:
“You’re pretty much at the mercy of the other person, if they try
to screw you reject it and get them back, otherwise take the money
and be happy.”
Examples of a pure Backward Induction advice (BI) were seen in the advice
given by the Receivers in generations 34 and 35 of the Advice-only treatment
who all told their successors to accept anything above 1 if it is oﬀered with the
following explanations:“accept any oﬀer that is oﬀered to you because to reject
means that you get nothing. (Generation 34), “Deﬁnitely accept anything, or
else you get nothing”. (Generation 35).
Finally, we added a category PR for prescription which refers to statement
that simply suggested a cut-oﬀ point without any real justiﬁcation. ( ”Don’t take
less than 40 — subject 47 of the the Advice-only treatment). These statements
are in fact close to BI+ statements and one might be tempted to lump them
together, but they did not go all the way and remind their successor that 40 is
better than nothing which is what we expect of backward induction thinking.
T h er e s u l t so ft h i sc o d i n ga r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e8w h i c hp r e s e n tt h er e s u l t s
of our coding for the Baseline and the Advice-only treatment.
31[Table 8 here]
One of the most striking features of Table 8 is the relatively infrequent use by
Senders of fairness considerations to support their prescriptions. For example,
fairness was not a principle that was invoked often (only 8 times in the Baseline
and 11 times in the Advice-only treatment). More interesting, however, is that
fact that when 50-50 splits are suggested, they are most often supported by
payoﬀ maximizing arguments and not equity arguments. For example, in the
Baseline, of the 24 cases in which a 50-50 split is suggested, only 7 are supported
by references to fairness (a good number leave no written advice, however). In
the Advice-only treatment, of the 15 times that a 50-50 split was suggested,
only 3 were supported by fairness arguments. Hence, observing a 50-50 split
does not appear to oﬀe rp r o o fo fe q u i t yc o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Also notable in Table 8 is the infrequent use of pure backward induction
arguments. For example, for Senders in the Baseline only four pieces of advice
relied on sub-game perfect-like arguments while only six such pieces of advice
relied on them in the Advice-only treatment. The overwhelming bulk of advice
h a dS e n d e r ss u g g e s t i n ga no ﬀer to their successor which, given their assessment
of the probabilities of rejection, either maximized their expected payoﬀ or con-
stituted a best oﬀer given their assessment of the minimum acceptable oﬀer
on the parts of Receivers. For example, there were 38 such pieces of advice in
the Baseline and 21 in the Advice-only treatment. When backward induction
is used, it is usually used to support sending a positive amount based on the
assumption that anything less than that amount would be rejected for sure.
32Hence, backward induction-like arguments are used, but not to justify sending
zero but rather to justify sending some positive amount.
With respect to Receivers, the situation is diﬀerent. Here recommendations
for behavior rely much more on fairness and spite-like arguments. For example,
in the Baseline spite and fairness are referred to 29 times to support rejecting
low oﬀers while in the Advice-only treatment they are used 12 times. Note that
pure backward induction arguments are more prevalent as well used 10 and
11 times for the Baseline and the Advice-only treatment. Here, being in the
position of the Receiver probably makes it easier to see how accepting anything
positive makes sense.
Observation 8: Subjects Create Oral History
When subjects do not have access to history but can pass on ad-
vice, they create an oral history through their messages which gets
passed on from generation to generation.
Substantiation.
Another interesting feature of the advice texts we read was the fact that
in the Advice-only treatment, where subjects were denied access to any history
other than their immediate predecessors, they included references to the meager
history available to them far more often than in the Baseline where all subjects
could scroll through the history of past generations. What we mean here is
while in the Advice-only treatment subjects could not ﬂip through the past
generations history and see what occurred, they were able to pass on their own
experiences from one generation to the next. Hence, a subject could say that
33his predecessor told him that his predecessor made oﬀer x and it was accepted.
In fact, it would be possible in such an experiment for all history to be passed
on through the medium of advice. The problem, of course, is that if ever one
generation fails to pass on a history, it is lost and the historical record must
start again from scratch.
As we see, in the Advice-only treatment where no history was provided
subjects made reference to either their own or their predecessors experience 23
times while they did so only 5 times when a full history was available in the
Baseline. This oral history appeared to be an attempt to compensate for the
otherwise meager historical setting of the experiment.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has studied the impact of advice in intergenerational Ultimatum
Games. What our results demonstrate is the overwhelming inﬂuence of advice
on the behavior of our subjects. As we have seen, advice tends to be followed
closely by Senders and dramatically lowers the variability of oﬀers when it is
present. Hence, games played with advice generate behavior which is more
“conventional” than those where advice is absent. Advice is also important for
Receivers aﬀecting both their rejection and acceptance behavior. However, for
Receivers it appears as if rejection behavior is most aﬀected by a deﬂation of
their expectations since most rejections occur when they receive an oﬀer that
was lower than what they were expecting even if that oﬀer is above their stated
34minimal accepted oﬀer.
5A p p e n d i x
Elicitation procedure for Receivers:
Let r = (r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10) indicate the reported beliefs of the Re-
ceiver. Remember that these are the Receiver’s belief that the amount sent
will be contained in one of ten disjoint intervals 0-10, 11-20, 21-30 31-40, 41-50,
51-60, 61 -70, 71-80, 81-90, 91-100. Since only one such amount will actually
be sent, the payoﬀ to player i (the Receiver) when an amount in interval l is
chosen will be:












The payoﬀs from the prediction task were all received at the end of the experi-
ment.
Note what this function says. A subject starts out with 20,000 points and
states a belief vector r = (r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10).I ft h e i ro p p o n e n tc h o o s e s
to send an amount in interval l, then the subject would have been best oﬀ if he or
she had put all of their probability weight on l. The fact that he or she assigned
it only rl means that he or she has made a mistake. To penalize this mistake we
subtract (100 − rl)2 from the subject’s 20,000 point endowment. Further, the
subject is also penalized for the amount he or she allocated to the other nine
intervals , by subtracting (rk)2 from his or her 20,000 point endowment as well.
The worst possible guess, i.e. putting all your probability mass on one interval
only to have your opponent choose another, yields a payoﬀ of 0 . It can easily
be demonstrated that this reward function provides an incentive for subjects
to reveal their true beliefs about the actions of their opponents. 11Telling the
truth is optimal.
Elicitation Procedure for the Sender:
As indicated above the Sender types ten probability vectors into the com-
puter of the following form: rk =( πk
a,πk
r), where k is the index of one of the
10 intervals between 0 and 100. Hence, πk
a is the probability that if an amount
in the kth interval is sent it will be accepted while πk
r is the complementary
probability that the oﬀer will be rejected. From this point on the payoﬀsa r e
determined by a quadratic scoring rule. For example, say that an amount in the
kth interval was sent, the Sender predicted that if he or she sent that amount
11An identical elicitation procedure was used successfully by Nyarko and Schotter (1999)
in their analysis of zero sum games and Schotter and Sopher (2000) in their investigation of
inter-generational Battle of the Sexes games.
35it would be accepted with probability πk
a, and it turns out that the oﬀer was
accepted. Then that Sender’s prediction payoﬀ would be deﬁned as follows:






In other words, if the oﬀer was accepted but the Sender only predicted that
it would be accepted with probability πk
a,the payoﬀ function penalizes him or
her by subtracting (100−πk
a)2 from his or her 20,000 point endowment. It also
subtracts (πk
r)2 since that is the probability predicting that the oﬀer would be
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36Table 1: Rotation Scheme For Subjects
Game
Period Battle of Sexes Ultimatum Trust
Period 1 Subjects 1 2 3
Subjects 6 5 4
Period 2 Subjects 2 3 1
Subjects 4 6 5
Period 3 Subjects 3 1 2
Subjects 5 4 6
Table 2: Oﬀers by Senders
All generations Last 40 generations
Treatment Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Baseline 44.70 14.95 45.66 15.95
Advice only 37.16 12.89 33.68 13.53
History only 42.45 21.96 43.90 19.66
Table 3: Oﬀer Behavior in
t h eB a s e l i n ea n dt h eA d v i c e - o n l yt r e a t m e n t
Baseline
coeﬀ.s . e . t P >| t |
Payoﬀ-max. oﬀer .11 .11 1.05 0.30
Advice sent .26 .10 2.62 0.01
constant 27.42 6.64 4.13 0.00
R2 = .11 F(2,77) = 4.64, Prob>F=.01
N=8 1
Advice Only
coeﬀ.s . e .t P >| t |
Payoﬀ-max. oﬀer .08 .07 1.08 0.29
Advice sent .53 .10 5.11 0.00
constant 13.05 5.63 2.32 0.02
R2 = .27 F(2,73) = 13.22, Prob>F=. 0 0
N=7 7
Table 4: Oﬀer Behavior in the History-only treatment
coeﬀ std. er. t P>| t |
Payoﬀ-max. oﬀer .16 .15 1.08 0.28
constant 34.56 7.78 4.44 0.00
R2 = .02 F(1,64) = 1.17, Prob>F=. 2 8
N=6 6
37Table 5: Advice in the Baseline and the Advice-only treatment
Treatment Mean Median Variance Std. Dev.
Baseline 44.48 47 270.97 16.46
Advice-only 38.25 40 158.71 12.59
Wilcoxon Test: z = 3.12, p=.00























Stated .10 .18 .28 .40 .55 .74 .78 .83 .82 .89
Historical .28 .85 .41 .50 .94 1.0 1.0 - - 1.0























Stated .18 .24 .38 .52 .69 .83 .84 .86 .87 .88
Historical 0 .35 .34 .94 .96 1.0 - - - -























Stated .12 .18 .30 .44 .55 .70 .76 .82 .86 .91
Historical .27 .42 .54 .51 .62 .85 - 1.0 .75 .89
N 4 4 16 12 18 4 0 3 2 3
38Table 7: Rejection and Acceptance Behavior
Variable: Oﬀer-Expected Oﬀer
Treatment
Prediction B AO HO
Acceptance: Oﬀer ≥ Expectation 33/66 29/59 19/46
Rejection: Oﬀer < Expectation 14/15 17/18 15/20
Variable: Oﬀer-Minimum Acceptable Oﬀer
Treatment
Prediction B AO HO
Acceptance: Oﬀer ≥ Minimum 62/66 59/59 43/46
Rejection: Oﬀer < Minimum 4/15 3/18 4/20
Variable: Oﬀer - Advice
Treatment
Prediction B AO HO
Acceptance: Oﬀer ≥ Advice 50/66 41/59 NA
Rejection: Oﬀer < Advice 10/15 13/18 NA
Table 8: Coded Advice
Senders
Experiment Type of Advice
BRA BI FA HA OA PA
Baseline 38 4 8 5 10 19
Advice-only 21 6 11 23 6 7
Receivers
PR BI BI+ FA
Spite HA OA PA
Baseline 71 1 3 2 9 8 1 1 1 3
Advice-only 7 10 6 12 5 3 13
39Figure 1.  Experimental Design
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Figure 3: Advice, Offer and Payoff Maximizing Offer
Generation
 Offer  Sender Advice








































Figure 4: Estimated Probability of Acceptance, by Treatment
x
 Baseline  Advice-only
 History-only
1 100
0
1
Figure 4:
41